


Rowhammer

Grundlagen und aktuelle Entwicklungen



DDR



DDR2




DDR3



DDR4







WOW

many bitflip


much cryptography



$c = m^e \bmod n$


$s_p = m^{d_p} \bmod p$


broken computer

```
if (authenticated) { return true; }
```









Und nu?

Fuzzing!



DIMM	Blacksmith				TRRespass [12]			
	$ \mathbb{P}^+ $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{fuzz}}^{\text{total}} $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{swp}}^{\text{total}} $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{swp}}^{\text{0}\rightarrow\text{1}} $	$ \mathbb{P}^+ $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{fuzz}}^{\text{total}} $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{swp}}^{\text{total}} $	$ \mathbb{F}_{\text{swp}}^{\text{0}\rightarrow\text{1}} $
\mathcal{A}_0	47	1,061	82,183	41,471	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_1	116	2,125	12,134	6,095	12	12	5	5
\mathcal{A}_2	462	106,815	134,702	68,801	715	16,054	7,404	4,563
\mathcal{A}_3	82	239	1,746	890	326	852	114	58
\mathcal{A}_4	460	1,604	5,132	2,602	78	105	22	9
\mathcal{A}_5	42	7,771	113,190	57,655	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_6	102	17,790	98,425	49,296	4	11	4	4
\mathcal{A}_7	66	3,415	32,090	15,988	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_8	83	11,105	92,660	46,914	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_9	349	1,176	4,889	2,461	14	844	1	1
\mathcal{A}_{10}	350	1,282	3,051	1,532	367	961	505	280
\mathcal{A}_{11}	202	632	3,171	1,630	261	479	38	25
\mathcal{A}_{12}	74	13,641	43,581	22,149	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_{13}	72	9,889	59,721	30,320	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_{14}	51	9,729	64,083	32,543	1	1	4	0
\mathcal{A}_{15}	67	8,333	52,580	26,483	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{A}_{16}	372	61,493	99,552	51,029	688	5,499	1,450	983
\mathcal{A}_{17}	425	57,245	138,601	70,902	711	12,196	3,871	2,690
\mathcal{A}_{18}	126	12,689	80,601	40,876	14	14	1	1
\mathcal{A}_{19}	107	2,543	11,599	5,736	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_0	9	11	63	22	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_1	7	14	506	256	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_2^\dagger	9	41	15	7	7	8	5	3
\mathcal{B}_3	1	2	111	58	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_4	101	177	1,107	577	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_5	19	24	14	6	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_6	18	41	78	46	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_7	4	4	70	34	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_8^\dagger	4	6	258	131	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{B}_9^\dagger	40	86	1,223	625	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_0	1	3	26	16	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_1	16	29	28	8	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_2	82	282	2,551	1,242	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_3	6	7	636	296	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_4	31	57	769	385	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{C}_5	23	58	1,028	516	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{D}_0	26	250	10,646	5,329	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{D}_1	37	458	6,655	3,406	3	3	0	–
\mathcal{D}_2	3	16	2,030	1,008	0	–	–	–
\mathcal{D}_3	41	463	6,797	3,475	8	8	1	1
Σ	4,133		1.168 M		3,209		13,425	

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